Three cups of coffee and lots of rambling, with few conclusions….
If that were true, then I can see both pros and cons to it: Pro, in that the membership ostensibly voted for a Chair who espouses a philosophy that the majority of members agree with, and therefore giving that Chair a bit more oomph with votes of the Board is reflective of the mood of the membership.
Con, because four AMC voters making decisions were not put there by the membership at large, and it just feels kinda not-cool to let a Chair have toadies with votes.
Which side of the fence do I fall on regarding these two points of view? Somewhere in the middle. I don’t think about it much, in part because truthfully, the appointed officers do NOT have a track record of consistently voting the way the Chair would prefer. We may be on the board by grace of appointment, but we’re still Mensans and very independent-minded. I’ve been appointed by three different Chairs—and in every term, I’ve voted my mind based on what I think is the best direction for the organization, and never once was I taken aside and forcefully instructed to vote a certain way by my leash-holder. Certainly anyone who watches the AMC and how we appointees vote can confirm that we do not have a pattern of going along with the Chair’s wishes.
The appointed officers are chosen for their skill-sets. If the DevOff, MemOff, and CommOff (setting aside the DoS&E, who is really a MERF representative) were elected, would there really be more than one candidate for each office with the requisite skills and time to serve?
On the other hand, regardless of how many candidates there are for these offices, what would be so bad about letting the membership have intput into the selection? On the other other hand, I can easily see someone running for CommOfficer based on a platform of “I’ll get rid of the three remaining filtered words in the Forums” and having no clue about variations of postal regulation issues Local Group newsletters have to deal with.
Anyway, my epiphany was that I should not be taking it personally when members opine that the four appointees should get booted. They’re not saying that because they don’t like the job I’m doing. They’re not saying that because I don’t do enough and don’t “earn my keep.” They’re not saying that because the responsibilities given to the appointed officers are unimportant. Members are wanting more obvious control over the composition of the Board of Directors. I think that if I knew that the responsibilies currently given to the Mem, Dev, and Comm officers would continue to be placed in the hands of appropriately-skilled volunteers, then I could get behind the “no more appointees” concept.
How to be assured of this, I don’t know. I mean, we have seen elections where the obviously-skilled secretary candidate lost to the obviously not-skilled-but-somehow-more-popular candidate. And we saw how well that turned out for the society. Imagine such a thing happening to the person in charge of marketing and PR?
It’s a conundrum, without a clear, obvious answer.
And then I got to my second flash of insight.
Does the sheer volume of stuff I do for Mensa entitle me to greater voice in the direction of the society? That doesn’t make sense—there are plenty of volunteers who put in just as many hours, if not more, but have no vote on the AMC.
What is the connection between the skills I (or any appointed officer) bring to the table and how valuable my input is when the Board is making decisions?
The current AMC comprises some representative and some not-directly-representative voting members: The RVCs ostensibly vote the way a majority of their consituents want them to. But what about the 1VC, 2VC, Treasurer, and Secretary? They vote based on their views, but not based on any sort of poll of their consituents. We appointees theoretically bring specific area knowledge and expertise to the table and debate. I think this is a good thing.
The case could be made to reduce the voting Board of Directors to only five or six members, generally elected, and then have a whole team of appointed people with the skills and knowledge without votes, but still reporting and advising the voters. That could work, but…. would it save any money? Would Mensa be well served if the input from those appointed people were only available vial email? Or would we end up paying to fly at least some of them to the AMC meetings so the discussions could happen face to face? What if we did do that, but only flew in the “experts” for agendas that have topics that pertain to their skill-sets?
Is the desire to eliminate the appointed officers a desire to reduce AMC meeting costs, to reduce the Chair’s “power,” or to make members feel like they have greater say in their governance?
3 comments:
I agree that the appointed officers have very specific duties that can require very specific skill sets. You could say the same about Secretary and Treasurer, and we elect those positions. I haven't heard people complain that the Chair gets 4 free votes from his/her appointees, but I have heard a lot of "why do 4 people get a free ride onto the AMC while the others have to win elections?"
Marc
The desire to eliminate the appointed officers stems from the concept that, in our society, legislators are elected, not appointed. That doesn't mean that officers with specialized knowledge and experience should not be appointed when and where appropriate, but those officers should not be legislators.
Those opposed to continuing the appointed positions seem to operate from an assumption that (1) appointed members will automatically support the Chair, (2) it is not "fair" some get to be on the AMC without having to run a race and (3) appointment deprives the voters of the chance to make decisions.
(1) As Robin has pointed out, her experience shows that appointed members don’t automatically vote with the chair more or less than the elected AMC members. The reality seems to be different than the concern.
(2) “Fairness” is situationally defined. It is fair that I have a billion dollars and you don’t. It is NOT fair that you have a billion dollars and I don’t. Claims of fairness are seldom a basis for good policy. Good politics perhaps, but not good policy.
(3) It does deprive the voters of the chance to make those particular decisions, but is that bad? The voters also don’t get to vote on the Executive Director or any of the staff. They don’t get to vote on where the AG is held and myriad other stuff. They DO get to vote for the Chair with the knowledge that he/she will make these appointments, so it cannot be said they are without indirect input into the process. This is much like the members of the US president’s cabinet. You get to vote on the top guy, but not the others who work closely with him. It may not seem “fair” (see above), but does it really deprive them of something valuable?
Then the question arises: Are there good reason to have these positions remain appointive? One could argue that the Chair, having spent years reaching that position, has had an opportunity to observe many members in action, including some who are not natural politicians. Will some of them be better suited to these positions than “the usual suspects” of Mensa politics?
One could also argue that the Chair has the opportunity to find people who have specific talents for these specific positions rather than self-selected candidates whose overriding interest is in serving Mensa, but doesn’t really care where.
Finally, is it really bad for the AMC to have a few people on it who have to be concerned about the voters at every turn? One concern we have in national politics is officeholders who pander to their voters rather than vote their convictions. The appointed AMC members may be more able to focus on being more creative in their approaches to their Mensa work, rather than having to tip their collective hats to whatever makes the fewest political ripples.
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