I’ve been thinking about the bylaws amendment #2—the one
about removing voting rights from the four appointed officers. One of the arguments people use is that
allowing those appointees to vote gives the Chair too much power.
If Alice wins the race for Chair, that implies that a
majority of Mensans approve of Alice’s intended direction for the organization.
Now assume Alice picks four people to be Communications
Officer, Membership Officer, Development Officer, and Director of Science & Education. (oops—erase that assumption, because the DSE is really the Mensa
Foundation representative to the AMC and is picked by the Foundation Trustees.)

(Never mind that it’s actually rather hard to imagine any Mensan being a mindless yes-man and that actual analysis of voting records shows this is not how things actually transpire).
If Alice wins because most Mensans like her vision for the organization, why would anyone NOT want her to have a little extra leverage via the appointed officers when it gets to making things happen and change? Sometimes people even vote for entire slates of candidates who profess to share a common platform. Why would you want to saddle a Chair you elected with a board who disagrees with her goals and ideas?

I understand the fears about GroupThink (see this previous post or this other post on that topic), and I agree that would be a very bad thing. But we must not use
that term and that fear to make us instead institute disagreement and gridlock.
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